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RECENT DAMAGING EARTHQUAKES IN JAPAN, 2003-2008
Robert Kayen, Ph.D. P.E.
U.S. Geological Survey
345 Middlefield Road
Menlo Park, CA 94025 USA
ABSTRACT
During the last six years, from 2003-2008, Japan has been struck by three significant and damaging earthquakes: The most recent M6.6 Niigata
Chuetsu Oki earthquake of July 16, 2007 off the coast of Kashiwazaki City, Japan; The M6.6 Niigata Chuetsu earthquake of October 23, 2004,
located in Niigata Prefecture in the central Uonuma Hills; and the M8.0 Tokachi Oki Earthquake of September 26, 2003 effecting southeastern
Hokkaido Prefecture. These earthquakes stand out among many in a very active period of seismicity in Japan. Within the upper 100 km of the
crust during this period, Japan experienced 472 earthquakes of magnitude 6, or greater. Both Niigata events affected the south-central region of
Tohoku Japan, and the Tokachi-Oki earthquake affected a broad region of the continental shelf and slope southeast of the Island of Hokkaido.
This report is synthesized from the work of scores of Japanese and US researchers who led and participated in post-earthquake reconnaissance
of these earthquakes: their noteworthy and valuable contributions are listed in an extended acknowledgements section at the end of the paper.
During the Niigata Chuetsu Oki event of 2007, damage to the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant, structures, infrastructure, and
ground were primarily the product of two factors: (1) high intensity motions from this moderate-sized shallow event, and (2) soft, poor
performing, or liquefiable soils in the coastal region of southwestern Niigata Prefecture. Structural and geotechnical damage along the
slopes of dunes was ubiquitous in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa region. The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake was the most significant to
affect Japan since the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Forty people were killed, almost 3,000 were injured, and many hundreds of landslides
destroyed entire upland villages. Landslides were of all types; some dammed streams, temporarily creating lakes threatening to overtop
their new embankments and cause flash floods and mudslides. The numerous landslides resulted, in part, from heavy rain associated with
Typhoon Tokage. The earthquake forced more than 100,000 people into temporary shelters, and as many as 10,000 displaced from their
upland homes for several years. Total damages was estimated by Japanese authorities at US$40 billion, making this the second most
costly disaster in history, after the 1995 Kobe earth-quake. The 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake was the third event of magnitude 8.0+ to
strike the southeastern portion of Hokkaido in the last 50 years. The event produced tsunami run-ups along the shoreline of southern
Hokkaido that reached maximum heights of 4 meters. Accelerations recorded by seismic networks of Hokkaido indicated a high intensity
motion region from Hiroo area to Kushiro City, with a PGA values in the range of 0.35 to 0.6g. Despite high acceleration levels, the
observed ground failure, liquefaction, structural, port, and lifeline damages were remarkably light.

INTRODUCTION
During the past five years Japan has been struck by three
significant and damaging earthquakes: The most recent M6.6
Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore) earthquake of July 16, 2007 off
the coast of Kashiwazaki City, Japan; the M6.6 Niigata Chuetsu
earthquake of October 23, 2004, as located in Niigata Prefecture
in the central Uonuma Hills; and the M8.0 Tokachi Oki
(offshore) Earthquake of September 26, 2003 effecting
southeastern Hokkaido Prefecture. These earthquakes stand out
among many in a very active period of seismicity in Japan
between January 1, 2003 and the present. In the upper 100 km
of the crust during this period, Japan experienced 472
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earthquakes of magnitude 6 or greater (Figure 1). Both Niigata
events affected the south-central region of Niigata Prefecture,
and the Tokachi-Oki earthquake affected a broad region of the
continental shelf and slope southeast of Hokkaido.
These three earthquakes, though the most significant, were not
the only damaging events of the past five years. In 2005,
northwestern Kyushu was shaken by the magnitude 7.0
Fukuoka-ken Seiho-oki earthquake (Fukuoka western offshore)
in Fukuoka Prefecture, March 20, 2005. Shaking lasted for
approximately 50 seconds. The quake occurred on the offshore
projection of the Kego fault in the Genkai Sea, The earthquake
resulted in one person was killed, and over one thousand injured.
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Figure 1: Damaging earthquakes in Japan, 2003-2008. Seven primary events are plotted against 472 events in the upper 100km of crust, of
magnitude 6 or greater, that struck Japan in that timeframe. Events where centered in the Tokachi region of Hokkaido Prefecture; The
southern central region of Niigata Prefecture; The Sendai Bay region of Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures; along the subduction zone offshore
Wakayama and Ise; and an unusual large event in northwestern Kyushu near Fukuoka.

Old homes made of soil-stucco and bamboo lathe (tsuchi-kabe
method) and covered with heavy ceramic Kawara roof tiles
accounted for almost all of the damage. On Genkai-jima, an
island offshore Fukuoka, landslides and structural collapses of
homes forced the evacuation of all the residents.

On the Japan sea coast on the Noto peninsula in Ishikawa
Prefecture, a M6.7 earthquake struck on March 25, 2007. The
earthquake was remarkable for the general lack of damage,
liquefaction or landsliding. One death was reported in the city of
Wajima and several hundred were injured.

On 26 May 2003, a deep M7.0 quake occurred along the Pacific
plate boundary injuring over 100 people in Iwate and Miyagi
prefectures. No death has been reported. Property damage was,
again, limited to several hundred old homes. Landslides were
observed in Ishinomaki City, Miyagi Prefecture and in Sumita,
Iwate Prefecture. Two years later, on August 16, 2005 another
Miyagi ken oki event struck Sendai Bay. This time M7.2 struck
Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures. Several fatalities occurred at a
structural collapse of a pool roof Sendai city, Miyagi prefecture,
and over a dozen injuries were reported.

The three damaging events, reported here, are described
beginning with the most recent. These events were each the
focus of reconnaissance activities of the EERI (Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute) and GEER (Geo-Engineering
Earthquake Engineering Reconnaissance) activities of the US
National Science Foundation. The geo-engineering observations
of the earthquake events described below are the product of the
reconnaissance activities and its’ participants. The contributors
to the reports and articles for each of the events are listed in the
extended acknowledgements at the end of the paper.
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(I) THE JULY 16, 2007 M6.6 NIIGATACHUETSU OKI EARTHQUAKE
The M6.6 mainshock of the Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore)
earthquake occurred at 10:13 a.m local time on July 16, 2007,
and was followed by a sequence of strong aftershocks (Figure
2). The event had a shallow focal depth of 8 km and struck in the
Japan Sea immediately offshore Kariwa. The quake affected an
approximately 100 km-wide area along the coastal areas of
southwestern Niigata prefecture and triggered numerous ground
failures as far inland as the Uonuma Hills located approximately
50 km inland - the source area of the 2004 Niigata Chuetsu
earthquake.
In Niigata prefecture, the JMA seismic intensity was 6+ (IX in
MMI) in Kariwa-cho, Kashiwazaki city, Nagaoka city, and also
Ohzuna-machi in Nagano prefecture. The downtown
Kashiwazaki City K-NET site recorded a PGA of 0.67g. The
earthquake resulted in eleven fatalities and nearly two thousand
injuries. Close to 1,100 collapses of residential structures
occurred almost exclusively in old bamboo and stuccoed postand-lintel structures with heavy kawara tile roofs. Many of
these collapses were associated with displacements on the slopes
of sand dune deposits or liquefied ground. Damage occurred in
lifeline utilities of gas, water, and electricity and to the world’s
largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility.
The power plant was in the region of highest iso-seismal
intensity. Expanded reports on the earthquake can be found at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2007/1365/ (Kayen et al., 2007),
www.eeri.org , and gees.usc.edu/GEER/
The spatial position and severity of ground failures and
structural damage are archived in a Google Earth database at
http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/infobank/n/nii07jp/html/n-ii-07jp.sites.kmz, which contains a comprehensive explanation of
each site. The use of Google Earth as an earthquake
investigation tool is presented in paper 3.55 of Session 3 of this
conference (Kayen et al, 2008a). High-resolution laser-mapped
data sets of the most significant structural and geotechnical
damage features were collected for preservation using a
terrestrial LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) system of the
USGS.
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Figure 2: Main shock and aftershock pattern of the 16 July 2007
Niigata Chuetsu Oki, Japan, Earthquake. The estimated moment
magnitude of the event is M6.6. The aftershock pattern is useful
for defining the principal rupture plane of the event. The worlds
largest nuclear power plant, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa facility of
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), is sited in the
epicentral region and experienced the strongest recorded
motions of the earthquake
Seismological Aspects Of The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki
Earthquake
Niigata is located in a subduction zone near the boundary
between the Amur plate and the Okhotsk plate (two relatively
small plates that lie between the larger Eurasia and Pacific
plates). The moment magnitude of the mainshock of this event
was estimated to be 6.6 using teleseismic data (USGS) and 6.7
using regional data. The Japan Meteorological Agency assigned
a magnitude of 6.8 to the mainshock.
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transmit due to communication congestion, and aftershooks
triggered the recorders and overwrote the buffer containing the
mainshock recordings. The 33 recordings of the new system
included 27 from a majority of the reactor and turbine buildings
and one 4-depth free-field array at the Service Hall. The data
indicates a large range in the foundation motions for the EW
component with PGA values ranging over a factor of two (322to-680 gal). The NS component shows more similar values
(267-to-311 gals). The large range in the EW component values
is likely due to different soil structure interaction (SSI) effects at
different units and spatial variation of the ground motion over
short distances probably due to the near-fault rupture mechanism
(Fig 4a and 4b). The large range of PGA values on the EW
component shows the need for multiple recordings at NPP sites
to reliably determine the input ground motions for the structures.
Figure 3: Acceleration response spectra for a damping
coefficient of 5%. From top to bottom: NIG016, NIG017,
NIG018, NIG019. The left panel is the EW component, the
middle panel is the NS component, the right panel is the Z
component. The horizontal axes represent frequency, in Hz, and
the vertical axes represent absolute acceleration as a fraction of
the acceleration of gravity.
The Niigata earthquake was a buried reverse-slip earthquake.
The hypocenter had an estimated depth of 8 km (NRI ESDP,
2007). Two potential planes of faulting are unresolved, as
aftershock locations fell on both planes. The rupture length is
estimated to be 30 km and the down-dip fault width is estimated
to be 22 km for both planes. The inferred location of the
hypocenter is at the northeast end of both planes and the rupture
is inferred to have progressed from the northeast toward the
southwest. Slip models for both rupture planes show a single
strong asperity in the western end of the rupture. The maximum
computed slip is 3.5m.

Figure 4a East – West peak accelerations (cm/sec/sec) in and
around Unit 1 (From TEPCO, 2007).

The Japanese nationwide strong motion network, K-net,
recorded the earthquake at 390 stations, with 20 stations within
50 km. The accelerograms obtained at station NIG018 (close to
the fault plane and within the area where damage was heavier)
have unusually low frequency content that is most likely due to
liquefaction below the site. Acceleration response spectra
computed for a damping coefficient of 5% are shown in Fig. 3.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant
The worlds largest nuclear power plant, owned by Tokyo
Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO) is located 7 km from the
epicenter reported by K-NET, 10 to 20 km above the fault plane
dipping southeast and 3 km above the northwest dipping plane.
and instrumented at 99 locations. The motions at 33 locations
with a new sensor system were recorded, but unfortunately the
recordings at the other 66 older instrument locations, including
two free-field down-hole arrays and most of the structural
arrays, were lost with the exception of the peak values. The
ground motion data on the old system could not automatically
Paper 3.54

Figure 4b Peak accelerations in and around Unit 5 Reactor
(From TEPCO, 2007)
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The performance of the facility was mixed: the main structures
did not suffer significant damage, but a fire started and
radioactive material was released. There was no loss of life and
the emergency shutdown system, which had been set to be
triggered by accelerations exceeding 120gal, operated
successfully. In structures surrounding the primary facilities of
the plant, a fire broke out in an electrical transformer. Radiation
leaks were caused by spilling of water from used nuclear fuel
cooling pools, failure of joints in exhaust pipes, and the falling
of drums containing low-radiation nuclear waste.

Figure 5: Damaged road at the nuclear power plant (Kayen et
al. 2007).
Structural and road damage that was observed was related to
problems with foundation soils, including liquefaction (Figure 5)
, embankment failure, settlement and distress of footings, and a
landslide. Joints of piping resting on isolated footings and
expansion joints in covered pathways failed, and underground
pipes supplying fire retardant to reactors broke because of the
relative movement between soils and the foundations. In a twostory steel building used for plant administration, drop-ceilings
fell and windows broke. Access through doors was impaired by
ground settlements of up to 40 cm. The plant was closed after
the earthquake and is currently undergoing inspections prior to
restarting.
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Fig. 6: Kashiwazaki Wastewater Treatment Plan on the south
side of Sabaishi River near its outlet to the Sea of Japan (Google
Earth map site RK9 RK9 N 37.38748 E 138.56587) Pipe breaks
due to separation of two halves of building (Photo taken on
7/21/07).
Liquefaction During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki
Earthquake
Liquefaction was observed from the southern port of Kasashima
village south of Kashiwazaki City, to Shiya village north of the
Kashiwazaki-Kawira Nuclear Power Plant.
Liquefaction
evidence was seen in four general settings: riverbank deposits,
beach deposits, dune sand, and placed fill. Along the Sabaishi
River, liquefaction and lateral spreading features were observed
for approximately five kilometers from the river-mouth. River
deposits near the sea liquefied and settled severely at the
Kashiwazaki wastewater treatment facility (Fig. 6) causing the
separation and differential settlement of two plant buildings.
Upriver, liquefaction resulted in settlement and lateral spreading
of the levee embankment near the Kai-Un Bridge (Fig. 7 and 8),
a large water main pipe separation, and a large lateral spread
along the river bank immediately east of the municipal
incinerator.
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Figure 7: Lateral Spread on North side of Kai-Un Bridge area
of the Sabaishi River (Google Earth map site RK6, N 37.39343
E 138.58555, 7/19/2007).
The U River, located in the southwestern portion of Kashiwazaki
City, was further from the epicentral region and exhibited less
liquefaction damage, all within one kilometer of the mouth of
the river.
A long, coast-parallel, surficial unit of dune sand extends within
and north of the city. This deposit was the source of numerous
liquefaction failures, particularly along the edge of the modern
flood plain (Figure 9). The sand was typically very soft under
foot, and may have been reworked in areas by the ancient,
meandering Sabaishi and U Rivers. At one site liquefaction
settled ground was observed around the foundation pile cap of a
large high-voltage power transmission tower leading from the
nuclear power plant. Though the soil pulled away from the cap,
the pile cap and tower had no indication of deformation (Figure
10)

Figure 8: Failure of reinforced concrete stack and a large
liquefaction-induced lateral spread on the north side of the
Sabaishi River (Google Earth map site SP31, N 37.3939° E
138.5840°).

Sandy fill deposits used for backfill for the wastewater and
storm water drain network performed poorly throughout the
epicentral region causing hundreds of separated and uplifted
manholes that incapacitated the drains and impeded traffic
(Figure 11). Ports and harbors suffered only moderate levels of
settlement and liquefaction-related lateral spreading.

Figure 9: Liquefaction and lateral downslope movement of
underlying soil buckled the floor slab of a large warehouse store.
(Google Earth map site RK41, N37.41468 E138.60840,
7/22/2007).
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Figure 10: Settlement of ground adjacent to the grade beam
between footings of a high voltage transmission line tower
(Google Earth map site RK40 - N 37.41633 E138.60792,
7/22/2007).

Figure 12: Coastal landslides on Highway 352 north of
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant at road closure south
of Route 373 (Google Earth map site RK34; N37.48455°
E138.62435°; Photo taken 7/22/07).
Shallow coastal landslides were observed to be 0.5 to several
meters deep in colluvial and residual soils and ranged from 5 m3
to several thousand cubic meters in volume. Typical slope
surface and failure plane inclinations were between 50° and 70°,
failing in translation as debris slides and slumps. Additional
landslides also occurred some distance away from the main
damaged areas (~10 km northeast of Kashiwazaki and 7 km east
of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant) in an upland,
mountainous region. These slides also generally consisted of
shallow translational events. Where transportation lines crossed
areas of steep terrain, landslides often blocked or destroyed
whole sections of roadways and railways. Three major
transportation routes were blocked by landsliding in the region:
the coastal road (Route 353) to the north of the KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Plant (Fig. 12), the railway to the south
of Kashiwazaki, at the Oumigawa train station on the Shin-etsu
Line (Fig. 13) and Highway 8, north of the intersection with
Route 252 located inland from the coast

Figure 11: Uplifted manholes from storm-water drains impeded
traffic and compromised rainfall drainage throughout
Kashiwazaki City and the surrounding villages.

Landslides During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki
Earthquake
Landslides caused by the earthquake consisted of shallow
translational slides, debris slumps, and deep-seated rotational
slides. In general, landslide activity was focused near the coast,
with many steep (50° +) slopes experiencing shallow landsliding
of overlying colluvial debris and residual soils (Fig. 12).
Paper 3.54
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Figure 14: Road embankment failure off Route 8 on the way to
Kasashima (Site YT18; N 37.33325 ° E 138.46500°; Photo taken
7/21/07)
Damaged Houses with soil-wall construction During The 2007
M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki Earthquake
Figure 13: Landslide at the Oumigawa Train Station on the Shinetsu Line (Google Earth map site RK20/YT16/SA9; N37.34490°
E138.48435°, 7/21/07)
An area of dense landslide activity not investigated by the field
reconnaissance team, but identified through helicopter
reconnaissance by the Japanese Public Works Research Institute
(PWRI) was identified approximately 20 km to the southeast of
Kashiwazaki, in the Takayanagi-Machi region. Because this
area is located a significant distance away from other observed
landslides from the earthquake, it is anomalous to the general
pattern of observed seismic-induced geotechnical and structural
damage and should be investigated more thoroughly.
Embankment failures were typical in road fills both along the
coast, and were also observed at three sites located further inland
(Fig. 14). Embankments underwent from 10 cm to in excess of
one meter of vertical displacement, extending between 10 and to
60 meters in length. Three embankment failures required full
closures of roads, and/or protection with tarps to reduce rainfall
infiltration and the associated potential for additional movement.
Among these was a 15-meter high, 97.5-meter wide, earth-fill
dam located to the east of the region, where cracking through the
midpoint of the crest was observed. The water level at the time
was well below the crest. At a water supply dam located
southwest from the city of Kashiwazaki, cracking of the crest
was also observed along with minor concrete cracking and
spalling on the upstream side. Here, the reservoir water level
was within several meters of the dam crest at the time of
observation.

Paper 3.54

The earthquake caused the collapse of nearly eleven hundred
houses in the Niigata prefecture in Japan. Damage to one-tothree story wood buildings was observed along the 30-kilometer
long coastal region between Hatsusaki, to the south, and Shiya,
to the north. Damage extended inland to western Nagaoka, 12
kilometers west of the coast. The city of Kashiwazaki reported
the highest number of collapses in the region. The structures that
collapsed were almost exclusively wooden structures and
unreinforced masonry fences. Preliminary estimates of collapse
rate were between 5 and 7% for buildings and houses in the
vicinity of the K-NET instrument in Kashiwazaki. A large
fraction of the houses affected were of old-style heavy clay-tile
kawara roofs with soil walls (Figure 15). Soft story collapses
occurred in buildings with open businesses on the ground floor.
The business arcade of Higashi-Honcho Dori was particularly
hard hit.
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Figure 15: Typical collapse of a heavy kawara-tile roofed home
supported by the weak & brittle tsuchi-kabe (“soil wall”)
construction technique and wooden post and lintel frame.
Bridge Damage During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki
Earthquake
Damage to bridges crossing the Sabaishi River (north of
Kashiwazaki) and the U river to (south of Kashiwazaki) was
caused by permanent deformation of embankments that run
parallel to the rivers and preserved in bridge bearings (Fig. 16).
Lateral and vertical deformations of embankments ranging from
a few centimeters to about a meter were observed.
Embankments cracked at their crests and, in instances, sand
boils flowed upward through these cracks indicating
liquefaction. Larger ground deformation, and more damage to
bridges was observed along the Sabaishi River compared with
the U River.
The bridges along the Sabaishi River consist of 15 to 100m-long
continuous steel I-girder or reinforced concrete superstructures
resting on elastomeric bearings supported by reinforced concrete
piers and abutments. The thickness of the bearings ranged from
15 to 30 cm. Bearings deformed where embankment slumping
pushed abutments toward the river (Fig. 16). Deformations of
bearings ranged from 7 to 17cm. Cracks up to 1-cm wide were
observed in reentrant corners of abutments. Spalling of
pavement and concrete was observed at expansion joints.

Damage to Utilities During The 2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki
Earthquake
According to the Niigata Prefecture Government, approximately
$13 billion in damage occurred to the lifeline infrastructure as a
result of this earthquake. Several lifelines remained closed a
month after the event. Water for the region is provided by
reservoirs in the mountains north of Kashiwazaki and two of the
three pipes carrying water into the city broke. Pipe breaks were
the result of landslides, lateral spreading, liquefaction, and soil
settlement. Manholes blocked roadways when pipes rose due to
soil liquefaction. Damage to the wastewater treatment plant,
including damage to pipes, clarifiers, sludge digesters, and other
equipment by soil displacements and differential settlements,
prevented removal of sludge from the system.
In addition to the problems at the nuclear power plant, there was
damage to the transmission system maintained by Tohoku
Electric. Towers, transformers, and other equipment were
affected by soil lateral spreading, soil settlement, and ground
shaking. There were five-minute to 10-hour power disruptions
after the earthquake. Natural gas lines broke as a result of
liquefaction and settlement of soils and pressurized tanks
exhibited permanent displacements after the event. One month
after the earthquake, restoration of service was ongoing.

Figure 17: Settlement of approach fill to bridges along the
Sabaishi, here, and U Rivers created critical transportation
hazards immediately following the earthquake.

Figure 16:
Strained bearing (site SA18, N37.39041°
E138.59052°; 7/21/2007)
Vertical offsets at bridge approaches caused by soil settlement
ranged from 5 cm to a meter (Fig. 17). Asphalt or gravel fill was
placed to permit cars to cross bridges. Utility lines attached to
bridges where approaches settled were damaged. Settlement of
approaches was observed at bridges crossing the Sabaishi and U
rivers and bridges along the Hokoriku Expressway.
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The high volume of calls following the earthquake and the
damage to underground optical cable conduits in five locations
impaired telephone and internet services. Approximately 5% of
the fiber conductors in these cables were cut. Power interruption
longer than 10 hours impacted cellular phone services. The
phone system was restored three days after the earthquake. A
phone emergency service system worked well during the
earthquake.
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Geoengineering Damage to Transportation Systems During The
2007 M6.6 Niigata-Chuetsu Oki Earthquake
Transportation systems were disrupted by landslides, lateral
spreads, embankment slumping and spreading, bridge approach
settlement, liquefaction of utility trench fills, and postearthquake sub-grade construction recovery efforts. In many
cases, roadways were blocked by landslide debris, in others, the
roadfill and foundation failed requiring extensive repair.
Despite the numerous road closures and pavement damage,
significant progress was made toward repairing critically
damaged roadways during the time of the reconnaissance.
The most striking damage to the transportation network was
caused by large landslides destroying sections of roads (Fig. 18).
In one location, both lanes of a busy regional highway were
moved down slope by about 10 m as a result of a deep-seated
slope movement. The road was re-opened less than seven days
following the earthquake, which is a testament to the excellent
Japanese post-earthquake response, and an illustration of the
importance of deploying reconnaissance teams soon after
earthquakes to record perishable data. A large lateral spread
affected a road near the Kashiwazaki municipal waste
incinerator, forming a headscarp with a vertical offset of 2.5
meters that transected the road. The pavement was heavily
damaged for a length of over 200 meters in the lateral spread
(Figure 8).

trench fills, and/or uplift of buried utilities due to buoyancy in
liquefied ground. Such damage typically caused closure of one
lane of traffic, and in only a few cases were closure of entire
roadways necessary due to utility trench fill liquefaction failures.
Damage to railways was caused by landslides (for example, at
the Oumigawa Train Station south of Kashiwazaki), settlement
of foundation soils, spreading and slumping of railway
embankments, and transient ground shaking. Horizontal track
offsets up to 30 cm were observed (Fig.19). Liquefaction and
resulting ground failure caused rail damage in many cases, but
there were cases where rail offsets occurred without ground
failure, presumably due to transient shaking. Some damage
occurred to trains carrying passengers at the time of the
earthquake - news reports immediately following the earthquake
indicated that a stationary train tipped over at Kashiwazaki
Station but that no one was injured.

Figure 19: Lateral deformation of train tracks at Arahama
Station (Site RK13; N37.40555° E138.60197°, 7/21/07)
Figure 18: The Ozumi Senbon Landslide (Site RK1; E37.41422°
N138.71347°)

Port and Airport Damage During The 2007 M6.6 NiigataChuetsu Oki Earthquake

Embankment failures affected transportation access, closing
partial to whole lanes. In most cases, one lane remained open
despite longitudinal ground cracks in many pavement sections
that required cars to progress slowly and carefully over the
damaged roadway. Settlement of soils at bridge approach fills
caused vertical offsets at many bridges by as much as one meter.
(Fig. 17). Two tunnels were closed: one due to landsliding near
the portal area and the other from unknown causes. Pavement
damage was widespread and caused by liquefaction of utility

The coastal location of this moderate-sized earthquake resulted
in moderate damage to port and coastal infrastructure from the
southwest, at the small village of Kasashima, to north of the
town of Kariwa. The Kasashima harbor exhibited negligible to
very minor evidence of ground deformation and seismic effects
to coastal infrastructure (e.g. quay walls, seawalls, breakwaters).
Trace remnants of very small, localized ground deformations
were observed, and it appears that the ground motions in this
area were just strong enough for incipient lateral deformation of
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the ground and waterfront earth retention structures (Figure 20).
The westernmost section of the Port of Kashiwazaki was
subjected to the effects of widespread liquefaction, lateral
spreading and settlement exceeding 30 cm in many areas and a
pronounced graben formed between a port building and the
waterfront quay wall. A pile supported structure performed very
well, but two pedestrian-accessible roof areas on either side of
the main structure were distressed by ground settlement and
lateral spreading.

Figure 20: Kashiwazaki Harbor – Liquefaction induced lateral
spreading and settlement of soil beneath a harbor-front caisson
resulted in rotation toward the harbor and lateral displacement of
the soil behind it (Site RK25, N37.36713
E138.53210,
7/20/2007).
Along the waterfront to the southwest of the Sabaishi River and
transverse to the riverfront sheet pile wall is a seawall that
extends southwest roughly 2.0 km towards the Minatomachi
Seaside Park. On the north end of the seawall, the lateral wall
movement was roughly 0.6 m and exhibited an increased
seaward tilt to the southwest with lateral deformation of
approximately 1.5 m to 2.0 m. At the TEPCO Nuclear Power
Plant liquefaction, ground settlement and tilting of a building
were observed near the shore on the west of Unit 5.
(II) THE NIIGATA KEN CHUETSU EARTHQUAKE OF
OCTOBER 23, 2004
The Mw 6.6 earthquake that struck Niigata Prefecture on the
evening of October 23, 2004, was the most significant
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earthquake to affect Japan since the 1995 Kobe earthquake.
Forty people were killed, almost 3,000 were injured, and
numerous landslides destroyed entire upland villages. Landslides
were of all types; some dammed streams, creating new lakes that
threatened to overtop their new embankments and result in flash
floods and mudslides. Landslides and permanent ground
deformations damaged roads, rail lines and other lifelines,
resulting in major economic disruption. The numerous landslides
resulted, in part, from heavy rain associated with Typhoon
Tokage. At Nagaoka City, there had been 100 mm (4 inches) on
October 20 and 13 mm (.5 inch) on October 21. The earthquake
forced more than 100,000 people into temporary shelters, and as
many as 10,000 will be displaced from their upland homes for
several years, if not permanently. Total damages are estimated
by Japanese authorities at US$40 billion, making this the second
most costly disaster in history, after the 1995 Kobe earth-quake.

Figure 21: Aftershock pattern and mechanism. The Unonoma
Hills are approximately outlined by dashed ellipse, and the
Shinanogawa Lowland is the white area to the west (adapted
from original figure by Group for Joint Observation, Kyoto and
Kyushu Universities).
The epicenter was in northwestern Honshu, about 80 km south
of Niigata City (population 500,000), a city well-known for
liquefaction damage following the 1964 M7.5 earthquake. The
2004 epicenter was beneath the Uonuma Hills along the
Shinanogawa Lowland (Figure 21).
Though the 2004
earthquake was felt in Niigata City, no damage or liquefaction
was observed there. South (or upriver) of Niigata, toward the
epicentral area, there are a number of smaller cities and towns on
the plain and some industrial sites; the remainder of the plain is
covered by wet rice farmland (i.e. rice paddies). Nagaoka
(population 194,000) was the largest city significantly affected
by the earthquake. It suffered minimal damage, but had highway
and train service disruptions, school closures, and an influx of
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refugees from surrounding areas. More seriously damaged areas
were the city of Ojiya (population 41,000) and surrounding rural
areas, most notably the village of Yamakoshi (population 2,222)
and the town of Kawaguchi (2000 population 5,748), which
sustained JMA intensity 7, the maximum on that scale
(approximately equivalent to MMI XI-XII).
The Joetsu
Shinkansen crosses this region in a north/south direction and
terminates in Niigata. One of its trains was derailed by the
earthquake.
Seismology And Strong Ground Motions During The 2004
Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake
The mainshock at 17:56:00 Japan time (08:56:00 UT) on
October 23 had a moment magnitude Mw 6.6. The epicenter
(lat. 37.30, long. 138.84) was located 4 km east of the city of
Ojiya (Figures 21 and 23). The main shock was followed by an
aftershock sequence with four events of JMA magnitude 6 or
larger, and 12 events of magnitude 5 to 5.9 (as of November 28),
far more than usual for an event of this magnitude. There was no
surface rupture observed with the earthquake, and the mainshock
is currently not associated with any mapped fault. The focal
mechanism of the main shock shows almost pure reverse
faulting on a fault striking 30 degrees east of north, dipping
down to the northwest at 54 degrees. The source area is 20-30
km long, with down-dip widths of about 14 to 25 km.
The earthquake occurred near the Sea of Japan in an area of
relatively high seismicity. Within 100 km, there have been five
other earthquakes greater than Mjma6 since 1941, including the
1964 Mjma7.5 Niigata earth-quake. All the large earthquakes of
the present sequence occurred beneath the mountainous region
east of Ojiya, where there are mapped Neogene-Quaternary
folds. Across the region, there are many mapped short
lineaments (1-10 km) trending north-east-southwest, along with
the recognized Muika-Machi-Bonchi-Seien fault (Geological
Survey of Japan).

Figure 22: Ojiya K-NET Seismograph NIG019. (top) PGA 1.33
g EW, 1.17 g NS, and 0.83 g UD, and (bottom) 5% damped
response spec-tra for two horizontal directions (source: NIED).

The hypocenter was in the central or lower region of the fault, so
the rupture propagated updip toward the east and along strike in
the north-east and southwest directions, with a duration of about
10-15 sec. The largest amount of slip was in an area about 10 km
x 10 km in the region of the hypocenter. Strong hanging wall
effects were manifested in the large peak accelerations recorded
above and to the west of the fault at locations such as Ojiya,
where 1.33g PGA and 128.7 cm/sec PGV were recorded 4 km
west of the hypocenter (Figure 22). The largest recorded peak
acceleration, 1.75 g (and 53.1 cm/sec PGV), was recorded at
Tohkamachi (NIG021), located about 20 km south-southwest of
the epicenter. Peak accelerations of 0.48g and 0.89g were
recorded at Nagaoka and Nagaoka-Shisho, respectively, located
16 km north of the epicenter. The peak acceleration recorded at
Niigata City, at an epicentral distance of 70 km, was 0.11g. For
comparison, the Mw 7.5 1964 Niigata earthquake, which caused
the extensive liquefaction, was located offshore at an epicentral
distance of about 55 km north of the city, and had a peak value
of 0.16 g, with a longer duration in Niigata City.
Aftershock hypocenters are distributed over a region that is
about 30 x 20 km at depths ranging from 15 km to the surface,
which roughly coincides with the area of the main-shock and
larger aftershock rupture areas. The locations show a complex
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pattern of westward and eastward dipping structures that are
associated with the mainshock and larger aftershocks.

indicate that some preexisting (ancient) deep-seated landslides
were not remobilized during the earthquake.

Figure 24: North-facing valley wall with extensive translational
soil sliding into valley bottom, Yamakoshi epicentral area
(photo: K. Kelson).

Figure 23: Map of affected area showing main effects of
mainshock (adapted from KKC aerial photos).
Geotechnical Aspects Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu
Earthquake

The most widespread type of observed failure consisted of
translational slip of the regolith and highly weathered bedrock
materials on very steep slopes flanking floodplains and along
incised river and creek channels. This type of failure generally
involves the upper 1.5-3 m of soil, and slip appears generally to
be concentrated along the interface between significant root
growth and underlying highly weathered bedrock. Examples of
this type of failure are shown in Figure 24.

Landslides, liquefaction, and permanent ground displacements
accounted for most of the physical and economic effects of the
earthquake. Figure 23 shows the distribution of landslides
caused by the earthquake, as well as areas where liquefaction
was generally observed. The map also shows other effects
discussed below.
Landslides During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake
Niigata Prefecture documents 442 individual landslides in this
earthquake, although on the ground the number appeared even
larger. Heavy rainfall in the days prior to the earthquake likely
had a fundamental impact on the distribution and scale of
landsliding. Bedrock throughout the area of major landsliding
consists of a folded sequence of very weak and friable claystone
and siltstone that is fairly nondurable, with interbedded
sandstone and minor conglomerate. For the argillaceous bedrock
materials, high antecedent moisture would tend to cause
softening and strength reduction, as well as elevated pore or
joint water pressures and seepage forces.
Observed modes of slope failure included translational soil slips,
deep-seated rotational slumps, debris-flows, slump-flow
complexes, and large block slides. In some cases, the failures
were clearly controlled by bedrock structure., Observations
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Figure 25: Typical debris flow, exhibiting a narrow path and
long runout.
Another commonly observed failure mode in areas of deep
regolith was slump-flow complexes within colluvium-filled
swales. If antecedent moisture conditions had not been so
severe, it is probable that the significant flow characteristics
commonly exhibited by these failures would not have been so
prominent. Many debris flows with significant runout distances
were triggered by the earthquake, as shown in Figure 25. In
13

several cases, massive debris flows blocked natural drainage
courses, forming landslide dams. These events have already
resulted in the flooding of villages and infrastructure (Figure
26), and there is potential for large sudden floods to initiate if
the landslide dams are breached in an uncontrolled manner.

Figure 26: Inundation of homes upstream of landslide dam
(photo:K. Kelson).

An earthquake-triggered landslide dammed a river about 1 km
west of Komatsugura. The landslide was a block slide that
formed on a dip slope dipping about 15-20 degrees west. As the
block moved downslope, a large graben formed at the head of
the landslide; the landslide moved across the canyon and
completely blocked the drainage. A lake several kilometers long
formed behind the dam and initially the lake was rising 15-20
cm/day despite efforts to pump water over the dam. Several
roads and structures had been inundated upstream. An
emergency spillway was being constructed to prevent
uncontrolled overtopping and catastrophic failure of the dam,
which could inundate downstream communities in ten minutes.
The landslide material consisted of weakly cemented Pliocene
and Pleistocene sandstone and mudstone that is easily erodible.
A classic example of a block slide can be seen in Figure 27. The
mould (negative impression) of the block is defined by a
bedding surface dipping at about 30° toward the freeface of the
slope, along with vertical joint release surfaces intersecting the
right side of the bedding plane. The overlying block of bedrock
traveled on the order of 30m-50m, riding over the valley floor.
This failure occurred along a hogback ridge, and bedding plane
slides of similar or larger size were observed at several locations
long the hogback.

Figure 27: Block slide formed by bedding plane (sliding surface)
and two sets of vertical joint release surfaces (photo: R. Kayen).
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Figure 28: Deep rotational slump, indicated by a block of back-rotated trees and agricultural land, beneath an approximately 30m-50m foot
high headscarp (photo mosaic: R. Kayen).

A major landslide at Shiroiwa (White Rock) drew international
attention because a mother and two young children were buried
in their car. They were discovered about four days after the
quake, with only the four-year old boy surviving.

in areas of the San Francisco Bay and Los Angeles would cause
similar damages and many more casualties.

As the bedrock throughout the area of major landsliding is
judged to be sufficiently weak under saturated conditions to
permit development of continuous shear on curved surfaces, it is
not surprising that deep-seated rotational slides occurred, much
like classical soil slumping. Figure 28 shows a deep rotational
slide, as evidenced by a block of back-rotated trees and
agricultural land bordering an approximately 30m-50m high
headscarp to the left. Farther downslope, similar back-rotated
blocks were observed, and the estimated maximum depth of the
sliding surface is on the order of one hundred meters.
A major question remains regarding the influence of prior
rainfall on slope stability. The extent of landsliding is very large,
and the authors are not aware of other earthquakes of similar
magnitude that have caused slope instability to this extent. If the
earthquake had struck under normal soil moisture conditions, or
relatively dry conditions, it is likely that the extent of landsliding
would have been significantly less.
This emphasizes that risk of prior rainfall should be considered
in any evaluation of seismically induced slope instability. Due to
the sparse population in the mountainous epicentral region, the
number of resultant casualties was surprisingly small. However,
seismically induced landslides under saturated ground conditions
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Figure 29: Sand boils at the derailing site of the Johetsu
Shinkansen (Oct. 25) (photo: K. Kiyono).
Liquefaction During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake
Evidence of liquefaction was widespread but sporadic, and was
primarily confined to rice fields along the Shinano River and to
backfill around sewer pipelines. Some sand boils were observed
15

under the Shinkansen viaduct (Figure 29) near the site of the
derailment, and under a few bridges. However, there was much
indirect evidence of liquefaction. Liquefaction may have
contributed to the many ground failures, particularly near
Kawaguchi, though no sand boils were observed. Ground
settlement on the order of tens of centimeters along the Uono
and Shinano rivers, along with levee slumping, could have
resulted from liquefaction. Ultimately, the amount of
liquefaction and associated ground failure was less than that
anticipated by members of the EERI reconnaissance team.
Hillside Fill Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu
Earthquake
The hillside residential area of Takamashi, located on the eastern
edge of Nagaoka, experienced significant slope failures during
the earthquake. Takamachi is located on a natural hill at the edge
of the Shinano valley and the native soil consists of early
Pleistocene sand and silt. It is assumed that the area was
constructed by cutting the top of the hillside and using this
material as fill along the edges. In most places, the fill was
confined by a 4m high rigid, concrete retaining wall. Four large
sections of retaining wall failed catastrophically, with the soil
sliding a significant distance downslope. Figure 30 shows one of
the large failures, extending across the road and close to the
adjacent homes. Four segments of the concrete retaining wall
translated significantly during the earthquake, including one that
came to rest within the trees downhill.

Figure 30: Failure of hillside fill in Takamachi residential area
(photo: E. Rathje).
In addition to the catastrophic failures, severe cracking due to
slope and retaining wall deformations was observed in many
areas along the edge of the hill. As much as 1 m of downslope
movement was observed, and these deformations caused
significant damage to structures. No failures or ground cracking
were observed in areas that did not have a retaining structure.

The yellow and red tagged structures within the Takamachi area
were almost completely concentrated in areas with adjacent
slope failures and ground cracking. Within the interior of the
hillside area, only green-tagged structures were encountered. It
appears that all of the structural damage in Takamachi can be
attributed to the deformations and failures of the hillside slopes.
Building Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu
Earthquake
As a generalization, building damage in this earthquake was
surprisingly light given the high apparent ground motions.
Traditional single-family Japanese houses of bamboo reinforced
mud infill and heavy fired clay tile roofing performed very
poorly being prone to pancake collapse. In the Niigata region,
houses tend to have larger and more numerous interior columns
and heavier roof beams, due to the heavy snows (up to 3 m)
every winter. A substantial number of these buildings collapsed
in Kawaguchi, although the effects of shaking and PGD were
hard to differentiate. Damage in Ojiya was lighter, although
there were still some collapses and heavily damaged houses.
There was very little to no damage to houses of this type in
Nagaoka.
Within the last two decades, a newer type of residential
construction has been increasingly built in the region,
presumably due to the snow accumulations, in which the entire
ground floor exterior wall is of reinforced concrete, with second
and third stories of more traditional wooden construction. These
buildings are significantly taller and larger than more traditional
housing, and are more like U.S. housing in that they have
shingle roofing rather than heavy clay tile. They fared very well
in the earthquake, having benefited from more modern building
codes and construction practices.
Commercial and institutional buildings generally performed
well, with some exceptions. A surprising success was a threestory 1960s vintage reinforced concrete (RC) frame school
building in Ojiya about 40 m from the 1.33 g PGA seismograph
recording. The building was completely un-damaged, with the
exception of a cracked brick chimney. Another success story
was a large three-story hotel complex situated on the ridge
directly above Kawaguchi. Despite having a landslide
immediately adjacent, the building sustained no damage, with
the exception of some minor pounding at a seismic joint between
two parts.
Large "big-box" stores are increasingly prevalent in Japan, and
two were observed in Ojiya with precast cladding having fallen
away from steel frames. Entry was denied, but extensive salvage
and repair operations were observed. A ten-story concrete-clad
building was observed to have classic shear cracking of
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columns, and an electronic chip fabrication plant was reported to
have sustained heavy nonstructural damage.
Lifeline Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu
Earthquake
After landslides, damage to lifelines was the most notable result
of this earthquake. Roads and highways were damaged at
numerous locations, with similar damage to rail lines. A historic
first was the derailment at full speed of a Shinkansen (bullet)
train. With that exception, transportation structures performed
generally well in this series of earthquakes. There were no
collapses; damages appeared to be limited and repairable, and
not surprising given the level of ground motions. Of the bridge
structures crossing the Uono and Shinano Rivers in the
epicentral region, all but two of the highway bridges were
immediately open for, at least, limited traffic after the
earthquake. The other two bridges were open for emergency
vehicles.

Figure 31: Typical damage to road in Uonoma Hills. (photo: R.
Kayen).
An unusual aspect of this earthquake was damage to
transportation tunnels. Water and power systems sustained some
damage, but were back in service within hours, except in the
hardest hit areas.
Road and Highway Damage During The 2004 Niigata Ken
Chuetsu Earthquake
Landslides and permanent ground displacements of varying
magnitudes seriously damaged roads at over 6,000 locations
throughout the region. Virtually all roads in the Uonoma Hills
were cut by landslides (Figure 31) and many pavements in the
lowland areas were disrupted by floating manholes, settlements
at culverts and bridge abutments, and general disruption of the
paved surface.

Figure 32: Derailed Shinkansen (Oct. 31) (photo: C. Scawthorn).
Highway bridge structures generally performed well in the
earthquake series, with the exception that significant settlement
of approach fills was observed on many bridges. Several
highway bridges suffered damage to piers and bearings, but
closure of the bridge was not required. A unique feature of the
region are pipes, carrying water at 13° C, embedded in concrete
along many streets and roads; the water is sprayed on snow in
the winter to melt it. Over 600 km of snow-melt piping exists in
the region, and much of it was damaged. Snow-plows cannot
operate on such roads, so considerable disruption occurred
during the first winter in areas where the pipes were broken
when the snows came.
There was extensive damage to roadbeds caused by ground
failures. Significant damage was observed on the Shinkansen
elevated viaduct, as well as on some local railway lines, but all
appeared to be repairable. The Joetsu Shinkansen line carries
360,000 passengers per day, and was scheduled to restore
service on December 28, 2004. A northbound Shinkansen train
derailed just south of Nagaoka City (Figure 32). As the train,
traveling over 200 km/hr, was exiting a tunnel, the driver felt the
earthquake and applied the brakes. The train passed under a
300-m-long covered section, and began to derail along a viaduct,
approximately 500 m from the exit of the tunnel.
The train engine came to rest approximately 1.9 km from the
tunnel exit, taking over 1.5 km to stop. There were no reported
injuries as a result of the derailment, which occurred entirely
along a straight section of elevated, level viaduct through rice
farms. The viaduct, constructed in the 1970s, is composed of
several different types of segments with varying heights and
section design, some of which were damaged in the earthquake.
Ground cracking, ground settlement, and signs of significant soil
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softening were observed at many locations along the viaduct
(Figure 29).

gas service took longer to restore, and as of October 26, 108,000
households still remained without running water and 56,000
without gas. Access was impeded by all the road closures. By
November 3, power was restored to all but 2,300 households,
mostly in evacuated parts of Yamakoshi and Ojiya.
Nagaoka City receives its water from the Shinano River,
upstream of the city. Water level in the river is raised by
lowering gates across the river, and water is diverted into a pipe
that carries the water to a treatment plant downstream of the
gates. The earthquake disrupted power to the gates and also
caused some damage to the wire rope machinery used to raise
the gates, so the gates could not be lowered and the treatment
plant received no water. As a result, the plant had to resort to
emergency drafting from the Shinano River (Figure 34).

Figure 33: Damaged piers of Joetsu Shinkansen Wanazu Bridge
(Nov. 1) (photo: S. Ashford).
In the town of Kawaguchi, the Joetsu Shinkansen railway bridge
was damaged. Piers supporting the Wanazu Bridge over the
Uono River suffered a flexural failure due to a reinforcement
discontinuity, as shown in Figure 33. Several columns of a
viaduct section just south of the bridge also failed. Tracks of the
JR Joetsu Line were also damaged due to minor fill settlement in
the Wanazu area. In Kawaguchi, rails were buckled in numerous
locations, and several plain concrete piers of the JR Iiyama Line
were damaged, while the superstructure remained intact.

Damage was more extensive at the Ojiya water treatment plant,
which also draws its water from the Shinano via an intake
structure and over the levee on an approximately 70-m long steel
truss bridge. Differential displacements of the supports damaged
the bridge, but did not cause collapse. In the plant, there were
obvious signs of ground settlements, and the plant had sustained
piping damage. The plant was back in operation in hours. From
the plant, water is pumped to two large 25m diameter hilltop
tank reservoirs, one on each side of the Shinano. Some ground
settlements had occurred around one of the tanks, and entry
structures had collapsed, but the tank was largely undamaged
and in operation. The hilltop location is within 1 km of the 1.33
g PGA recording in Ojiya, and the hilltop had sustained
landsliding and damage to nearby houses, and clearly had
undergone very strong shaking.

Several tunnels were damaged in this event, including the 8.6
km Shinkansen tunnel, which had fallen lining at about midlength and buckled track. Spalled lining occurred in the Wanatsu
Tunnel of National Route 17.
The earthquake cut off all power, gas, water, and telephone
service to Ojiya city. Upwards of 300,000 households in the
region lost electric power. As of Sunday evening, the day after
the earthquake, 98,000 homes in Ojiya and Nagaoka still lacked
electric power. Water supplies were cut through most of the
affected area, and the lack of telephone service added to the
isolation of the mountain areas cut off by landslides. Many areas
received water from tank trucks, dispatched from neighboring
areas.
Electric power was restored steadily, but as of October 26,
34,000 households were still without power, mostly in Nagaoka
and Ojiya. Tohoku Power employed 1,900 repair workers, but
they were impeded in some places by damaged roads. Water and

Figure 34: Emergency drafting of water from Shinano River for
Nagaoka City Water Treatment Plant (photo: C. Scawthorn).
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Approximately 23 km from the epicenter is the KashiwazakiKariwa Nuclear Power Station, at 8,300 MW (7 units) the
world’s largest Nuclear Power Station (NPS). The October 23
main shock reportedly had no effect on the NPS, but a
magnitude 5.2 Earthquake on November 4 caused Unit 7 to shut
down automatically (other units operated at the rated thermal
power). In Kawaguchi, the Shinkansen has a substation stepping
power down from 63kv to 1500 volts(the service voltage for the
Shinkansen catenaries). Transformers in the substation were
significantly tilted due to liquefaction, but still operating, and
otherwise the substation was undamaged.
Social Impacts Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake
The most seriously affected areas were small towns and villages
near Nagaoka, especially the village of Yamakoshi, the town of
Kawaguchi, and the city of Tokamachi. As is true in rural areas
throughout much of Japan, the population has been in decline,
with Yamakoshi and Kawaguchi declining by 11.9% and 5.9%,
respectively, from 1995 to 2000. Nearly 40% of Yamkoshi
residents and 25% of Kawaguchi residents are elderly. Although
the earthquake occurred in mid-autumn, winter was rapidly
approaching, and Niigata Prefecture is known to receive some of
the heaviest snowfall in Japan.
Because landslides cut off transportation and communication to
many areas, it took some time for emergency services to identify
damage and assess needs. There were re-ports of family and
neighbors rescuing people from collapsed homes. By the
morning after the Saturday evening earthquake, the Self-Defense
Forces (SDF) opened a disaster headquarters in Ojiya to
coordinate relief efforts, and used 300 personnel, 21 helicopters,
and 65 vehicles to transport food and water to evacuation sites.
They also evacuated tens of thousands of residents to emergency
shelters, and used helicopters to airlift stranded villagers from
the hamlet of Shiotani.
More difficult was reaching the isolated towns of Kawaguchi
andYamakoshi, which initially depended on airlifted food and
water until they could be rescued the following day. In
Kawaguchi, about 300 people took refuge in an elementary
school and awaited assistance. By Monday evening, relief
supplies were coming in over the roads, but still with not enough
food for the population. In Yamakoshi, 250 residents spent two
nights in a gymnasium without power or water before being
evacuated. All but six of Yamakoshi’s 2,200 residents were
evacuated and taken to three sites in Nagaoka. The national
government applied the disaster relief law to 29 localities, which
meant that government would cover the cost of relief and
shelter.
Many people spent the first night in their cars, but by the day
after the earthquake, 82,000 were staying in emergency shelters.

In Ojiya, 14,500 people took refuge at 93 different evacuation
centers, mostly school gymnasiums and public halls. Even in
lightly damaged Nagaoka, more than 34,000 people were
evacuated to temporary shelters. On Monday, October 25,
thousands were airlifted from about 60 mountainous
communities, which remained closed to road access. Thirty
police and SDF helicopters were needed to evacuate residents of
seven municipalities. By Tuesday, October 26, about 320 people
were still stranded in five hamlets.
Aftershocks and landslide dams posed continuing problems. A
M5.2 aftershock on November 4 halted the bullet train line
between Niigata and Nagaoka. It also closed down a section of
the bullet train tracks that had just reopened. A M5.9 aftershock
on November 8 again stopped the bullet train and closed a
portion of the expressway to Tokyo. Continued rain during the
ten days following the earthquake raised concerns about water
behind the landslide dams in Ojiya and Yamakoshi. The Japan
Meteorological Agency set up alarm units and surveillance cameras at five landslide dams, the prefecture prepared pumps to
lower the water levels, and the prefecture recommended
evacuation of 101households containing 439 residents.
As of November 28, authorities attributed 40 deaths to the earthquake. Although most died from building collapses,
approximately 14 deaths were from stress-related illnesses
following the earthquake. One hospital patient died when an
artificial respirator detached during the earthquake. Five died
from complications due to living in their cars, including blood
clots from inactivity. As a result, the prefecture encouraged
people to move into SDF tents or to stay in accommodations
farther away. Elderly residents were especially susceptible to
exposure and stress-related illnesses.
Economic Effects Of The 2004 Niigata Ken Chuetsu Earthquake
Agricultural activities in Yamakoshi were disrupted by the
earthquake, and residents fear permanent consequences. The
village’s main industry is the raising of carp, which it provides
to decorative ponds throughout Japan. The cattle industry is
another concern. Residents had to leave behind 1,000 cattle. In
order to save his business, the largest cattle owner began ten
days after the earthquake to airlift 700 cattle out of the village by
helicopter, at considerable expense.
Area industries were also affected. Hokuetsu Paper Mills plant
in Nagaoka shut down for several days, as did Matsushita
Electric’s chip production center. The Niigata Sanyo Electric
Plant in Ojiya, which employs 1,500 workers and is Ojiya’s
largest employer, is closed indefinitely. An auto parts plant has
been unable to resume its speedometer assembly line, which
caused Honda Motor Company to halt auto production at four
plants elsewhere in Japan. Other plants shut down for
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approximately one week, including Panasonic Communications,
and Alps Electric Company.
The Tokyo Stock Exchange fell on the Monday following the
earthquake, with the largest losses to Japan Rail East, companies
with production facilities in the area, and insurers. On the
positive side, the Japan Times reported that shares of
construction-related companies increased sharply November 1on
the Tokyo Exchange, because investors anticipated a
supplementary national budget to pay for reconstruction
following the earth-quake and recent typhoons. However,
reconstruction will be a challenge to homeowners, since only
11.2 % of households in Niigata Prefecture have earthquake
insurance, compared to 17.2 % nationally.
First Application of LIDAR Technology for Earthquake
Reconnaissance
For the first time, a reconnaissance team utilized LiDAR, a 3-D
scanning-laser that can create high-resolution, threedimensional, digital terrain models of any surface, including
earthquake-related ground, structural, and lifeline deformations.
Approximately 30 laser scans of damaged roadways, structures,
and displaced ground were taken with a tripod-mounted LiDAR
apparatus, a portable device that models surfaces to a
measurement accuracy of 1-2 cm.

Figure 35: Photograph (below) and LiDAR image (above) of
damage to the Juetsu Railroad portal at Kita-Horinouchi from
the portal entrance. Lateral displacement of the portal in the
photo is visible and measurable in the LiDAR scan. (: R. Kayen)
An example of structural damage captured by the USGS LiDAR
unit is presented in Figure 35, collected in the damaged portal of
the Juetsu railroad tunnel, north of Horinouchi town. The portal
is founded on a poorly compacted embankment fill that failed
during the earthquake. The portal pulled away from the tunnel,
settling vertically, sliding downslope, and rotating. In the
photograph, the offset in the portal can be seen along the left
wall of the tunnel, and the rotation can be seen in the ceiling. An
oblique view of the LiDAR point-cloud data can be seen on the
right. The left-lateral offset in the portal is clearly visible in the
LiDAR model. In the LiDAR imagery, precise centimeter-scale
measurements can be made of the three-dimensional
deformation of the structure.
(3) OBSERVATIONS ON THE SEPTEMBER 26, 2003,
TOKACHI-OKI EARTHQUAKE
Seismological Aspects Of The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki
Earthquake
The 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake was the third event of
magnitude 8.0+ to strike the southeastern portion of Hokkaido
in the last 50 years. The earthquake hypocenter was located at
latitude 41.9° north and longitude144.1° east, at a depth of 42
km (Figure 1). The slip distribution inverted from seismograms
shows this as a repeat rupture of the 1952 Tokachi-Oki M8.2
event fault segment. Both events are megathrust earthquakes
that result from segmented rupture of the Pacific plate beneath
the Hokkaido-Tohoku accretionary prism.
The primary M8.0 event occurred at 4:50 a.m. local time on
September 26, 2003, and was followed by a second M7.1
event at 6:08 a.m. Both events triggered ground failures along
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the southern coastal region of Hokkaido. The primary event
produced tsunami run-ups along the shoreline of southern
Hokkaido that reached maximum heights of 4 meters in the
areas of Taiki and Erimo.
Accelerations recorded by seismic networks of Hokkaido
indicate a high intensity motion region from Hiroo area to
Kushiro City, with a PGA values in the range of 0.35 to 0.6g
(Figure 36). The highest PGA (1.0g) is an apparently anomalous
recording at the Hiroo City Hall, behind the bluff overlooking
the nearby Port of Tokachi (~0.45 g). Acceleration response
spectra for Hiroo and Tomakomai are presented in Figures 37

and 38, respectively. Despite high acceleration levels, the
observed ground failure, liquefaction, structural, port, and
lifeline damages were remarkably light. The reason for this is
not fully understood, but may be associated with the unusually
high frequency of the major loading cycles. Ground motion
durations were typical of an M8 event. In the southeastern
coastal areas close-in to the rupture, significant loading (>0.05g)
had durations ranging from approximately 1.5-to-3 minutes. On
the Japanese Shindo intensity scale, the region from Urakawa,
west of Erimo peninsula to Kushiro felt intensity 5-6. Other
portions of Hokkaido and northern Tohoku, Honshu felt motions
of intensity 2-4.
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Figure 36: Effects of the 2003 Tokachi-Oki earthquake. Peak ground accelerations and tsunami wave run-up heights were reported by
JMA, PARI and other organizations. The region of damaged ground covered a 400 km wide swath along the coastal areas of southern and
southeastern Hokkaido. Details and intensity of the damage effects are reported in damage quadrants described in the map legend.
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Figure 37: Acceleration response spectra for ground motions
recorded at Hiroo at 5% damping.

Figure 38: Acceleration response spectra for ground motions
recorded at Tomakomai at 5% damping.

Liquefaction During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake
Liquefaction was observed over a broad geographic region,
from Sapporo to Kitami, though it was quite dispersed and
localized. In addition, it was almost exclusively limited to
manmade fills. Locations where liquefaction was observed is
presented on Figure 36, and examples are discussed here and in
the following sections of the article as well.
Sapporo is located approximately 200 km from the epicenter of
the 2003 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake with recorded PGA of 0.07g.
Liquefaction and structural damage was observed in Sapporo
during the 1968 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake, and it was of interest
to compare the performance between the two earthquakes.
There was one isolated incident of liquefaction in the
Utsukushigaoka suburb of southern Sapporo. Several sand
boils were observed in the 2500 m2 area, in a low spot in the
surrounding neighborhood. Seven houses were damaged from
settlement, and the most severely damaged had suffered a tilt of
up to 2.5 degrees (Figure 39). Specific sites of observed
liquefaction in the 1968 earthquake, specifically in the NishiNaganuma area between the Ebetsu and Yubari Rivers did not
have evidence of liquefaction during the 2003 event. Perhaps
the most spectacular example of liquefaction was located in
farming country in northeastern Hokkaido town of Tanno,
approximately 10 km northeast of Kitami City. Here, four large
ground failures occurred over a 1 km2 area as a result of
liquefaction.

Figure 39: Damage to houses in Utsukushigaoka suburb of
southern Sapporo from liquefaction induced settlement.
The largest of these was 50 m wide and 200 m long (Figure 40),
and 5000 to 10,000 m3 of material is estimated to have been
expelled. Though lateral movement of the 1.5 m soil cap was
limited to perhaps 1 m, the cap settled nearly 3 m as a result of
the loss and evacuation of the underlying sand, which clogged
drainage culverts for 100's of meters down stream. Local
weakly cemented volcanic ash deposits were used for the
borrow material, and fills as thick as 5 to 8 m were placed 20
years ago over former terraced rice fields for beet production.
Performance of Port and Harbor Facilities During The 2003
M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake
Three major ports were affected by the earthquake, and for the
most part performed very well. In the west, liquefaction was
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observed in the Port of Tomakomai, but there was no resulting
damage. One oil storage tank was consumed by fire, and it is
suspected that the fire started as a result of strong shaking.

Figure 40: Flow failure in a farm field near Kitami City, where 5,000 to 10,000 m3 of volcanic ash fill soil was expelled from a single site
as a result of liquefaction (Photo Mosaic: R. Kayen).
The town of Hiroo hosts the Port of Tokachi, and damage in the
port and town was relatively minor, even though accelerations
as high as 0.6g were recorded in the port. Damage in the town
was limited primarily to stucco and plaster damage to older
buildings. Sand boils were widespread in new areas where the
ground had been placed by hydraulic fill within the last 3 years.
However, sand boils were not observed elsewhere at the port,
where soil placed prior to 1993 had experienced two
liquefaction triggering events during the significant 1993
Kushiro-Oki and 1994 Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquakes. The
height of tsunami run-up in the port was observed to be 2.5 to 3
m, washing three cars and other debris into the harbor, but not
causing structural damage to ports facilities.

eastern piers including the Fishermen’s Terminal. Piers 1
through 3 and the Fishermen’s Terminal were built prior to
1993, and suffered liquefaction and structural damage from the
1993 Kushiro-Oki and 1994 Hokkaido Toho-Oki Earthquakes.
Piers 1 through 3, and to some extent the Fishermen’s Terminal,
have been improved by stone columns and/or deep cement
mixing since 1994. All have caisson type quay walls.

The Port of Kushiro was the most severely damaged of the ports
on Hokkaido. The Port consists of 4 western piers (Piers 1
through 4 on the west side of the Kushiro River), and several
Paper 3.54
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Building Damage During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki
Earthquake

Figure 41. Lateral movement of 10 cm and settlements of 100
cm were observed at Pier 4 of the Port of Kushiro, causing its
closure. Piers 1 through 3 suffered minor damage and were
quickly reopened.
Pier 4 was the most heavily damaged, with lateral movements
of the 14 m deep quay wall of approximately 10 cm, and
settlements behind the wall ranged from 60 to 100 cm (Figure
41). Sand boils were observed in an open area, approximately
30 m from the wall behind a paved area. The paved area was
underlain by mixed soil-cement, and it may be that settlement of
rubble-fill beneath the soil-cement mixture, rather than
liquefaction, was the cause of the observed damage. Directly
adjacent to Pier 4 was a well-instrumented quay wall test
section to study the behavior of improved and unimproved
ground. With over 130 channels of data acquisition, including
pore pressure transducers and downhole accelerometers, the
data set from these earthquakes as well as many smaller
earthquakes should provide a wealth of new information to
researchers.

Building damage was also observed over a large geographic
area, but with a localized and relatively limited character.
Typical examples of the localized damage are the town halls of
Kushiro and Taiki, where recorded PGA's were 0.46g. At the
Kushiro Town Hall, the reinforced concrete entranceway
collapsed, after the two columns supporting it failed. The
windowed roof-observatory of the Taiki Town Hall collapsed as
a result of strong shaking. In both cases, no other damage was
reported in the main structures. Other buildings observed had
been damaged from excessive settlement. The most significant
was the Urakawa Elementary School, where spalling on
concrete was observed on columns after the entrance settled
(Figure 42). Other reported damage includes the airport at
Kushiro, which was closed for one day due to the collapse of
the non-structural hanging ceilings in the control tower and
terminal building. A regional description of structural damage
can be seen on Figure 36.
For the most part, bridges performed quite well, with the
exception of excessive relative movements between spans that
led to shear key damage at the top of several piers, and some
settlement of approach fills as noted earlier. All bridges were
open to, though some were subjected to reduced speeds and lane
closures.

The sections of Piers 1-3 that had undergone improvement
performed well. The unimproved areas of Piers 1 and 2 suffered
10 to 15 cm of settlement behind the quay wall, and some signs
of liquefaction were observed in the interior of the both of these
piers. Liquefaction and smaller settlements less than 10 cm
were observed on Pier 3. Piers 1 through 3 were only briefly
shut down for inspection directly following the earthquake. One
section of Pier 4 with a hybrid caisson-type quay wall was
closed for one day, then reopened. The remainder of Pier 4
remains closed and will remain so for months.
Liquefaction and settlements were observed at the Kushiro
Fishermen’s Terminal, as well as lateral movement of the quay
wall, and this new damage overprints unrepaired damage from
the 1993 and 1994 earthquakes. One warehouse at the south end
of the pier had suffered severe settlements and tilting from all 3
earthquakes, yet still remains in operation, though leaning
badly.
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Figure 42. Damage to Urakawa Elementary School.
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Bridge Damage During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki
Earthquake
Examples of damaged bridge structures include the Shizukawa
Bridge and the Tokachi-Kako Bridge northeast of Hiroo. The
Shizukawa Bridge is located in Tomakomai area where the
ground motion had recorded PGA was just over 0.1g, but was
of long duration and dominantly long period motion. For this
bridge, the relative movement between the abutments and first
piers resulted in significant damage to the shear keys (Figure
43), possibly as a result of pounding. Even so, the bridge did
not collapse and was still in service. In all cases, no damage was
observed in the columns or at the foundation level. All damage
was concentrated at the pier-superstructure connection appeared
to be the result of excessive relative displacement, either
transverse or longitudinal, depending on the bridge.

government and tsunami researchers were the high numbers of
people not heeding the tsunami warning. Initial surveys
indicated that perhaps 50 percent of the coastal residents
ignored the issued tsunami warnings.
Landslides During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake
Reconnaissance carried out from a fixed-wing aircraft combined
with automobile and foot traverses through the Hidaka
Sanmyaku and other mountainous areas of southeastern
Hokkaido failed to yield evidence of much significant landslide
activity on natural slopes. The only known, minor damage from
such landslides was a rock fall of perhaps a few hundred meters
total volume that was reported from a steep slope adjacent to the
coastal highway at Hiroo, However, material from this landslide
had been rapidly removed after the earthquake. Other landslides
from natural slopes observed by the reconnaissance team
consisted of scattered small rock falls, rock slides, and debris
slides from particularly steep slopes. These had volumes
ranging from less than one-to-several thousand cubic meters
each, and most were sourced from existing scars where such
activity had clearly originated in the past as well.
The earthquake produced several embankment and fill failures
in the region around Toyoroko. These failures produced cracks,
slumps, and in some cases lateral spreads accompanied by sand
boils indicating an association with soil liquefaction. These
failures were most common in deep fills for highways that had
been constructed to provide a smooth grade for roads passing
from valley bottoms to adjacent upland areas. Locally, such fill
and embankment failures caused significant damage, especially
to roads
Lifelines During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake

Figure 43. Damaged shear key from the Shizukawa Bridge near
Tomakomai City.
Tsunami During The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi-Oki Earthquake
The main shock produced coseismic uplift of the seafloor
southeast of the Hiroo Peninsula, generating a tsunami with
shoreline wave heights of up to 4 m, and 2 to 3 m high in
numerous locations, as shown in Figure 1. Two fishermen in
Otsu were missing immediately following the tsunami,
presumably drowned, and three cars were washed into the
harbor at the Port of Tokachi. Other than that, the tsunami was
responsible for very little damage. In many cases, the waves did
not exceed the height of the tsunami barriers, and in locations
were the backland was inundated, they were just barely so and
damage was light.
Of great concern to the Japanese
Paper 3.54

Lifelines covered in this section that were affected by the
earthquakes include sewers, roads, and other utilities. By far,
the most widespread damage to lifelines was to the storm and
sanitary sewer systems. Significant uplift of manholes was
reported from Urakawa in the west to Hamanaka in the east.
The team observed uplift as high as 2 m in Otsu (Figure 44) and
dozens as high as 1.5 m in a single subdivision of ShintoyoCho, immediately east of Kushiro City. In all cases, the uplift
appeared to be related to liquefaction of the pipeline backfill
material, and damage was aligned with the layout of the pipenetwork. Though the phenomenon appeared to be widespread,
there were no reports of widespread sanitary sewer failures.
Many had been repaired by the time the team came through.
While damage to roads was not widely reported, the team
observed widespread, but minor, damage to Highway 336
between the Rekifuna River and Tokachi River. The approach
fills to numerous small bridges experienced settlement and
many had been patched with asphalt. In addition, many slumps
were observed along the shoulder of the highway, but none
large enough to affect traffic. In Chobushi, the team observed
ground failure of Route 912, completely closing the road. This
26

roadway failure appeared to be the result of collapse of a prism
of embankment fill built over a lowland and culvert. With the
exception of the ground failure on Route 912, most damage to
roadways appeared to be relatively minor and more of a
maintenance issue.

generating facilities. The 2007 Niigata Chuetsu Oki (offshore)
earthquake primarily a “geotechnical earthquake”: liquefaction
damage, poor response of dune sand deposits, and lateral
spreading of river bank deposits were the major sources of
damage.

There were no reports of power or telephone loss due to the
earthquakes, though severely tilted telephone poles were
observed near Kushiro. The team did observe a severed fiber
optic cable on the Tokachi-Kako Bridge, where fill had settled
60 cm relative to the abutment.

The 2004 Niigata Chuetsu (onshore) earthquake could be
characterized as a “landslide earthquake”. Thousands of large
and small downslope landslide and debris flow scars were
observed throughout the Uonuma Hills of Central Niigata
Prefecture. These landslides shattered the transportation and
communication network, isolated villagers in small hamlets in
upland hills and hindered emergency response activities. A
large rockslide on the banks of the Shinano River destroyed a
local transportation route and resulted in several fatalities.
Liquefaction damage was relatively light during the event.
The 2003 M8.0 Tokachi Oki earthquake occurred in almost
nearly same location as the 1968 offshore earthquake. This
event is noteworthy as a “tsunami earthquake” for the wave
generated by tectonic uplift of the seafloor and the observed
local wave run ups of 1-4 m on beaches along the southeastern
shore of Hokkaido island. Despite the large magnitude of the
earthuake and accelerations observed near the mouth of the
Tokachi River and at Kushiro City, geotechnical and structural
damage were relatively light.

Figure 44. Uplifted manhole near a sewage treatment facility in
Otsu town, near the Tokachi river.
LESSONS LEARNED
During the period from 2003- 2008 Japan was struck by seven
events that resulted in damage ranging from light-to extremely
heavy. The three worst events are described in detail in this
paper, each with their unique characteristics. The 2007 Niigata
Chuetsu Oki event was the first significant and damaging
earthquake to strike close in to a large modern nuclear power
plant. Damage at the plant has been the focus of intense
investigation and documentation by the Tokyo Electric Power
Company, the Nuclear Safety Commission Of Japan, and the
United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency. In the
United States, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is
documenting the lessons learned from this event in the hopes of
improving the US response to earthquakes at nuclear power
Paper 3.54
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